

Continuity and change: The role of nativism and gender attitudes in the long-term dynamics of radical right party support

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Abstract

Defined by values of nativism, authoritarianism and populism, radical right parties (RRPs) have also been associated with traditional attitudes on women's roles in the family and workplace. As such, gender traditional nativists are often purported to be their core supporters. But does this RRP voter profile hold over time across Western Europe? We examine this question using extensive individual-level data from three waves of the European Values Survey complemented by 15 waves of Dutch LISS panel data. While confirming the continuing role of nativism in RRP support, we find that traditionalist attitudes about gender roles do not describe the only type of RRP voter. Since 2009, there is also an important set of gender-egalitarian nativists who are attracted to these parties. Further analysis of the panel data suggests that this phenomenon reflects expansion to new RRP voters rather than the conversion of established radical right supporters to more gender-egalitarian views.

Keywords

gender role attitudes, nativism, radical right, voter, Western Europe

Over the course of the last 50 years, radical right parties (RRPs) in Western Europe have changed from minor niche parties focused largely on anti-immigration platforms to become major political competitors that have diversified their issue agendas, gained significant electoral support and entered governmental cabinets (e.g., Dickson and Hobolt, 2024; Mudde, 2019; Spoon and Williams, 2023). Has their voter base changed over time as well?

This article examines the constellation of attitudes that distinguish RRP voters over time in Western Europe. We specifically study the long-term dynamics in the role of nativism and gender attitudes – traditional and egalitarian conceptions of women's roles in the family, the workplace and society in general – behind RRP electoral support. The former represents the core issue position that originally distinguished their voters (Ivarsflaten, 2008), whereas the latter, especially a traditional view of gender roles, has emerged as a policy implication of their reputation as *Männerparteien*, or men's parties (e.g., Linders et al., 2023; Mayer, 2015; Mudde, 2019; Xydias, 2024).

We join a growing literature examining the role of nativism and gender in voter attitudes and voting support for the radical right (e.g., Akkerman and Hagelund, 2007; Allen and Wallace Goodman, 2021; Chou et al., 2021; Christley,

2022; Lancaster, 2019; Lodders and Weldon, 2019; Ortiz Barquero et al., 2022; Spierings et al., 2020; Spierings and Zaslove, 2015). But while this work is often based on few survey waves and individual countries, or focuses on the related but distinctive attitudes about the LGBTQ + community, our study draws on extensive time series cross-sectional data [three waves of European Values Survey (EVS)] supplemented with panel data [15 waves of the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS)] to elucidate the long-term dynamics in the nativist and gender roles attitudes of RRP voters across Western Europe from 1999 to 2023. Support for the RRP is measured by intention to vote for the RRP at the time of the survey.¹ With this data, we are also able to more precisely determine the timing of any shifts in the attributes of RRP voters, thereby helping to resolve the literature's debate about the primacy of gender traditional versus gender egalitarian attitudes in the RRP electorate (e.g., Christley, 2022; Lancaster, 2019; Spierings and Glas, 2021). Furthermore,

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the panel data allow us to causally identify whether shifts in attitudes reflect the conversion of existing voters or expansion of the party's electorate to new voters.

Our analysis confirms the continuing centrality of nativist attitudes for RRP voter support over time, while also revealing the presence and timing of distinctive RRP supporter gender role attitudes. Not only do we find that those holding traditionalist gender attitudes are significantly more likely to vote for the RRP, but also these are not the only type of gender attitudes associated with voting for *Männerparteien*. Our analyses allow us to identify that since 2009, nativist voters espousing gender egalitarian attitudes also make up an important RRP electorate. This timing is consistent with the RRP's increased use of femonationalism – gendered rhetoric employed to advance anti-immigrant and anti-immigration positions (Farris, 2017; Fernandes et al., 2024; Gul, 2024; Lawall, 2023). Further, as shown in the LISS panel data, these gender egalitarian voters represent an expansion of the RRP electorate to gender egalitarian nativist voters, rather than the conversion of established radical right supporters to more gender egalitarian views. This gender-egalitarian nativist electorate is more likely to be composed of women – creating a new female-driven RRP gender disparity – but men are not completely excluded from this set of gender egalitarian RRP supporters.

Our paper brings extensive data to illuminate the long-run dynamics of the RRP electorate in Western Europe. In capturing both the continuity and change inherent in their supporters' attitudes, our study highlights a flexibility previously underappreciated about the RRP: despite their originally niche status, they exhibit a growing ability to incorporate new groups of previously untapped voters. Attracting gender egalitarian as well as gender traditional nativists, the RRP poses a potential threat to parties across the political space.

The (stable and changing) nature of radical right party voters

To understand the attitudinal profile of a political party's voters, scholars have often followed the logic of spatial competition theory and examined a given party's issue positions. Here, RRP parties have demonstrated both consistency and change. Despite the expansion of the RRP's issue agenda over time (Dickson and Hobolt, 2024; Spoon and Williams, 2023), scholars continue to confirm the centrality of nativism to the party family's ideology (e.g., Mudde, 2015; Rooduijn et al., 2023). It is not surprising therefore that researchers have found that RRP voters espouse anti-immigration positions and are distinctive from other party supporters on the basis of their nativist attitudes. For instance, drawing upon data from 2002 to 2003,

Ivarsflaten (2008) finds that RRP voters across seven Western European countries express a homogeneous preference for anti-immigration positions, while holding heterogeneous positions on other issue dimensions (including economic policy). Similar conclusions have emerged in both cross-national and single-country studies around the globe involving observational and experimental data (e.g., Chou et al., 2021; Kefford and Ratcliff, 2021; Ortiz Barquero et al., 2022; Sniderman et al., 2004; Spierings and Zaslove, 2015; Van der Brug et al., 2000). While the RRP's platforms have broadened over time, we therefore expect nativism to remain a core element in RRP voter support. It follows:

H1: Nativist attitudes increase the likelihood of voting for an RRP.

There is more debate in the literature about the centrality of gender attitudes (gender traditional vs gender egalitarian views) to RRP support. On the one hand, while formal classifications of the RRP family have excluded reference to their positions on gender issues, RRP have gained a reputation as *Männerparteien*. This image extends beyond their male-dominated party leadership and voter demographics (e.g., Coffé, 2018; Givens, 2004; Hartevelde, 2015; Spierings, 2015; Weeks et al., 2023) to include perceived support for traditional conceptions of women's roles in the family, the workplace and society in general (e.g., Linders et al., 2023; Mayer, 2015; Mudde, 2019; Norocel, 2011, 2016; Ralph-Morrow, 2022; Xydias, 2024). This traditionalist view of gender roles can be summarized as follows: women are primarily seen as mothers and care providers, and men are viewed as the primary breadwinners, prioritized for employment outside of the home.² Supportive of this stance, specific gender-related policies adopted by RRP have included pro-natalist measures, child subsidies to facilitate stay-at-home mothers, rejection of 'gender ideology' and the related concept of gender equality and anti-affirmative action measures (Celis et al., 2014; Meguid et al., 2025; Weeks et al., 2024). Drawing upon expert survey data on European parties, Campbell and Erzeel (2018: 80) conclude that "parties of the populist radical right overwhelmingly...continue to adopt traditional or antifeminist gender ideologies."

Whether these gender traditional positions are reflected in the attitudes of RRP voters has been less studied. There is an important related but separate literature generally finding positive relationships between sexist attitudes (hostile and modern) and support for the RRP and its policies (e.g., Anduiza and Rico, 2024; Coffé et al., 2023; Green and Shorrocks, 2023; Off, 2023). But there is less research looking explicitly at whether voters' attitudes on gender roles are consistent with the radical right parties' traditional stances on women's place in the family, workplace and in

society. Arguing that RRP's nationalism is linked to a patriarchal conception of gender relations, [Christley \(2022\)](#) finds a correlation between gender traditionalism and radical right party support in the 2017 wave of the EVS. Furthermore, according to one of her measures, gender traditional attitudes increase the likelihood of support for the RRP regardless of respondent stance on immigration. [Lodders and Weldon \(2019\)](#) similarly find a positive relationship between past RRP vote and a respondent believing men have more right to a job outside the home than women.

Even if voters are not aware of explicit RRP policy platforms supporting traditional gender roles, we might also expect RRP voters to stand out for their gender traditional attitudes: with men more likely than women to hold gender traditional values ([Hayes et al. 2000](#); [Lodders and Weldon, 2019](#); [Weeks, 2022](#)), the persistent pro-male gender gap in support for the RRP party should translate into a more gender traditional RRP electorate overall. There is a lack of long time series cross-sectional analyses of RRP voter gender attitudes in the literature, but we expect that RRP voters would stand out over time for their more gender traditional attitudes. Not only should those views become more rare and thus distinctive of the RRP given the societal trend towards more gender egalitarian attitudes in Europe in the 21st century ([EVS, 2022](#)), but also the recent backlash against feminism by young conservative women embracing stay-at-home lifestyles (e.g., "Tradwives") may be fueling a gender-traditional RRP resurgence ([Miller-Idriss, 2025](#)).

We therefore expect:

H2: Gender traditional attitudes increase the likelihood of voting for an RRP.

On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that gender traditional attitudes may not be, or may no longer be, the only gender views held by RRP and their voters. The recent increase in radical right party women MPs and party leaders has fueled questions about whether greater descriptive representation will lead to greater substantive representation of women's policy interests and perhaps a shift towards more gender egalitarian policy stances, following the trend often seen with mainstream parties (e.g., [Kittilson, 2008](#); [Kroeber, 2022](#); [O'Brien, 2019](#), although see [Dingler et al., 2018](#)). Analyses of RRP manifesto coverage paint a mixed picture. [Meguid et al. \(2025\)](#) indeed confirm that RRP's attention to women's interests - such as work-family balance, violence against women, and gender equality - is on the rise, albeit associated with RRP electoral concerns rather than female MPs or party leaders. However, that increased policy attention does not translate into the RRP's adoption of a broader gender egalitarian position ([Meguid et al., 2025](#)). On average, RRP have espoused a mixed stance on gender attitudes since 2000, with a slightly more gender traditional tilt. While individual cases of RRP

gender egalitarian positions have been identified – for instance, the French RN's support of abortion and divorce access, or the Norwegian Progress Party's promotion of state-sponsored child care – in general, the RRP's position on gender roles is not about the wholesale replacement of traditional with more egalitarian gender attitudes.

That being said, where scholars have consistently identified an RRP embrace of gender egalitarian positions is as rationale for their anti-immigration ideology (e.g., [Farris, 2017](#); [Fernandes et al., 2025](#); [Lawall, 2023](#)). Coined femonationalism by Sara [Farris \(2017\)](#), European RRP have emphasized how immigrants' "patriarchal" Muslim religion and culture threaten female bodily autonomy ([Meguid et al., 2025: 15](#)) or more generally how the acceptance of Muslim immigration is effectively condoning "regressive attitudes towards gender equality" ([Choi et al., 2022: 19](#)). Given the central role of nativism in the RRP's reputation and voter base, we argue that the gender egalitarian voters the RRP are appealing to with their gender equality and femonationalist appeals are not the women's rights advocates of the political left *who support immigration*. Rather, these parties are using gendered rhetoric to amplify their core anti-immigration position, and they are appealing specifically to nativist voters who are worried about their egalitarian status in light of increasing immigration and the presence of "others." In other words, the impact of gender attitudes on voter support of the RRP is modified by their nativist attitudes.

There is emerging research suggesting that indeed RRP are drawing gender egalitarian voters, specifically gender egalitarian nativist voters. [Christley \(2022\)](#) finds that gender egalitarian attitudes increase RRP support amongst the most (99th percentile) xenophobic respondents. While this result is an exception to her broader conclusions about the centrality of gender traditional nativists, other scholars consistently argue for the growing importance of egalitarian – but not necessarily gender-focused – nativist RRP voters. Using data from 2004/2016 and 2017, respectively, [Lancaster \(2019\)](#) and [Spierings and Glas \(2021\)](#) find that RRP attract "sexually modern" or "gender-modern" nativist voters, a group of nativists who express progressive attitudes. These works are not exclusively focused on gender attitudes: [Lancaster \(2019: 606\)](#) bundles "gender equality, gay and lesbian rights, and respect for tradition" with anti-immigration views, while [Spierings and Glas \(2021\)](#) define this modern nativist group as nativists supporting gender equality, LGBT + rights, abortion and divorce.³ In addition to not knowing the definitive role of *gender role* attitudes in voters' support for the radical right from this latter work,⁴ the lack of detailed time-series data in this literature in general means we cannot identify *when* egalitarian positions emerge as central to RRP support. We therefore cannot adjudicate between those works arguing for the centrality of gender traditional versus gender egalitarian attitudes for RRP voters.

In this article, we recognize the importance of both sets of gender attitudes for RRP supporters. We agree with [Christley \(2022: 1142\)](#) that it is premature to “abandon the idea that the traditional attitudes, particularly gender attitudes, matter deeply for radical right support,” and we predict that gender egalitarian attitudes will be positively correlated with RRP support, but only in combination with nativist attitudes. With the acceleration in femonationalist appeals in both RRP manifestos and parliamentary speech in the 2000s ([Fernandes et al., 2025](#); [Meguid et al., 2025](#)), this combination of gender egalitarian and nativist preferences should become increasingly descriptive of RRP voters over time.

We therefore arrive at the following hypothesis:

H3: Nativist attitudes increase the likelihood that an individual with gender egalitarian views votes for an RRP.

Empirical analyses: Study I: Cross-national Western European data

To identify the dynamics of RRP voter attitudes on gender roles and nativism, we follow a two-part empirical strategy. We examine cross-national individual-level EVS data on voter attitudes ([EVS, 2022](#)), complemented with within-country panel data from the Dutch LISS survey ([Scherpenzeel and Das, 2010](#)). We employ EVS data from 13 Western European countries from 1999 to 2017 involving 37,611 respondents across three waves.⁵ The EVS is attractive because it offers the most comprehensive country and year coverage of questions on nativism and gender attitudes of other pan-European survey options. We examine responses from wave three (1999) through five (2017-8).⁶

We examine voter support for the RRP, measured by a dummy variable coded “1” if a respondent indicates support for an RRP, and “0” if they indicate support for another party. The precise wording from the EVS varies across waves, with the question in waves 3 and 4 asking which party a respondent would vote for as their first choice, and the question in wave 5 being “which party appeals to you most?”⁷ We take an inclusive approach to identifying radical right parties, drawing on the categorizations by [Norris \(2005\)](#), [Mudde \(2007\)](#) and [Norris and Inglehart \(2019\)](#). Our results are also robust to limiting our coding to the more restrictive set of populist radical right parties identified by PopuList 3.0 ([Rooduijn et al., 2023](#)) (see [Supplemental Material \(SM\) Table A3, and A4](#)).⁸

Our main independent variables capture attitudes about gender roles and nativism. We construct a dummy variable measure of traditional gender role attitudes (“Gender Traditional”), coded “1” if a respondent espouses views that (1)

a woman’s place is to bear children and to not work outside the home and that (2) her children will suffer if she does, or the corollary that (3) a man has a greater right to a job outside the home than a woman. A respondent who consistently disagrees with these views is coded as having a gender egalitarian attitude (coded “0”). This inclusive definition of gender traditional attitudes – where support for any one of these statements is indicative of gender traditional views – reflects the finding that there may be social desirability bias against responding that a woman’s place in society is in the home or that she has fewer rights than a man ([Lodders and Weldon, 2019](#)). The model results are, however, robust to an alternative continuous coding scheme.⁹

To measure nativism, we create a dummy variable (“AntiOther”) coded “1” if the respondent identifies Muslims, immigrants, or those of a different race as being undesirable neighbors and “0” if they mention none of these groups. This measure is based on the only nativism question included in all EVS survey waves. While this is a blunt question focused on a respondent’s personal experience and attitude, which is likely to underestimate their anti-immigration views,¹⁰ the results of the analyses are consistent with previous findings based on other survey data used by [Christley \(2022\)](#) and [Lancaster \(2019\)](#) and the more nuanced nativist questions from the LISS panel data we present in the [Supplemental Material](#).¹¹ We include the interaction between the gender traditional and nativist attitudes variables to examine how nativism modifies the impact of gender attitudes on the likelihood of voting for the radical right.

Following the literature on radical right voting (e.g., [Anduiza and Rico, 2024](#); [Lancaster, 2019](#); [Norris and Inglehart, 2019](#); [Stockemer et al., 2018](#)), we include age, gender, education and income as controls. As indicated in the regression tables, we also include country and wave fixed effects to account for any country- and time-invariant effects not captured by our independent variables and covariates.¹²

Results

We begin to see the distinctiveness of the RRP electorate relative to other party supporters in logit models of RRP support. To test H1-2, we run additive models in [Table 1](#). The main variables of interest are Gender Traditional and AntiOther variables. The first three columns in [Table 1](#) show results by wave. Column 4 reports the pooled results using waves 3–5. All the models in this table have country-fixed effects. The pooled model also has wave-fixed effects.

The results of our additive table show that as one moves from being pro-other to anti-other, the likelihood of supporting the radical right party increases. This finding supports H1 and is in line with the literature highlighting the

centrality of nativism to RRP support (e.g., Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2007, 2015). Similarly, as one moves from being gender egalitarian to gender traditional, the respondent is more likely to support a RRP (consistent with H2). This effect is statistically significant at conventional levels in each of the individual waves as well as the pooled model.

What we do not yet know from these models is whether groups of gender egalitarian nativists were mobilized to support the radical right, as was thought to be the goal of the RRP's increased femonationalist and gender egalitarian appeals in recent years (Farris, 2017; Gul, 2024). To assess Hypothesis 3, we employ interactive models, whereby we examine the effect of nativist attitudes on the probability that gender traditional versus gender egalitarian respondents support RRP. The results in Table 2 are suggestive of the importance of nativism modifying the impact of gender

attitudes on RRP support, but only in later years (2009+); while gender traditional respondents are more likely to support the RRP in each wave, gender egalitarian nativists are only significantly correlated with RRP support in waves 4 and 5.¹³ This latter result is consistent with the findings that femonationalism – an overt effort to attract gender egalitarians to nativist parties – only emerged in RRP manifestos and parliamentary speech across Europe in the 2000s (Fernandes et al., 2025; Meguid et al., 2025).

Because the magnitude, sign and significance of interaction effects cannot be correctly read off the regression results in non-linear models (Ai and Norton, 2003), in Figure 1, we plot the predicted probabilities of supporting the RRP for each of the four constellations of nativist and gender attitudes from the pooled model, while keeping all control variables at their means.¹⁴ There are three main conclusions from this figure. First, consistent with H1, respondents with nativist attitudes are more likely to support RRP than those with pro-other attitudes. These differences in probabilities between anti-other (the two left values) and pro-other groups (the two right values) are significant, regardless of gender attitude. Second, gender traditional attitudes lead to a higher probability of RRP support than gender egalitarian attitudes, but only among pro-other respondents.¹⁵ This comports with Christley's (2022) claim that gender attitudes may become a backdoor means by which RRP attract new (and non-nativist) voters. Third, as posited by Hypothesis 3, there is a notable difference in the probability of RRP support among gender egalitarian respondents;¹⁶ gender egalitarian respondents with nativist attitudes are significantly more likely to support RRP than their non-nativist counterparts. Indeed, as shown by the overlapping confidence intervals around their point estimates, gender egalitarian nativists are not distinguished

Table 1. EVS: Effects of attitudes on RRP support.

	Dependent variable			
	Support for RRP			
	W3	W4	W5	Pooled
Gender traditional	0.444* (0.178)	0.588*** (0.154)	0.475*** (0.061)	0.447*** (0.069)
AntiOther	0.958** (0.343)	1.384*** (0.285)	1.356*** (0.319)	1.235*** (0.306)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,126	11,357	17,128	37,611

Note. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$; **** $p < 0.001$. Logit models with robust standard errors clustered at the country level.

Table 2. EVS: Interactive effects of attitudes on RRP support.

	Dependent variable			
	Support for RRP			
	W3	W4	W5	Pooled
Gender traditional	0.564** (0.191)	0.884*** (0.193)	0.786*** (0.111)	0.736*** (0.101)
AntiOther	1.326*** (0.267)	2.034*** (0.369)	1.996*** (0.152)	1.900*** (0.132)
Gender traditional*AntiOther	-0.421 (0.344)	-0.803* (0.391)	-0.921*** (0.273)	-0.868*** (0.251)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,126	11,357	17,128	37,611

Note. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$; **** $p < 0.001$. Logit models with robust standard errors clustered at the country level.




Figure 1. Predicted probability of supporting RRP (EVS data). Note. 95% confidence intervals are presented. “Gender Tra.” = Gender Traditional. “Gender Ega.” = Gender Egalitarian. The figure is populated using the “effects” package in R.

from the more stereotypical gender traditional nativists in supporting the RRP.

Conversion or expansion? Where are these gender egalitarian nativist RRP voters coming from? - Study 2: LISS panel data

Our analyses so far have confirmed that Western European RRP have experienced continuity and change in their electorate over time. RRP continue to attract nativist voters, and, consistent with their image as *Männerparteien* and as champions of patriarchal authoritarian positions, they attract gender traditional voters. But since 2009, we are also seeing a set of gender egalitarian nativists being drawn to these parties. It has not yet been directly assessed in the broader literature, however, whether these voters actually represent a new electorate (electorate expansion) or are just existing RRP supporters whose gender attitudes have changed over time (electorate conversion).¹⁷

The idea of conversion is consistent with two mechanisms, the first being that as Western European societies have become more favorable towards women’s roles outside the home, perhaps these established RRP nativist voters are shifting to espouse the now-more-popular gender egalitarian attitudes (Choi et al., 2022: 139; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). This is consistent with Lancaster’s (2022) finding that individual’s gender attitudes are subject to lifecycle effects, with attitudes becoming more progressive over time. The second possible mechanism follows the finding that voters might align their attitudes with those of their parties (Harteveld et al., 2017). While the predominant gender attitude among the RRP would seem to be a traditional stance, the parties’ increased use of femonationalism and

appeals to nativists on gender egalitarian terms (Fernandes et al., 2025; Gul, 2024) might lead previously gender traditional supporters to realign their gender attitudes. It follows:

H4: (Conversion Hypothesis) Nativist respondents with prior RRP support are more likely to become gender egalitarian.

Alternatively, consistent with an expansion story, it could be that gender egalitarian voters are newly attracted to RRP. Individuals holding both gender egalitarian and nativist views are increasing in number across Western Europe, according to Lancaster (2022). RRP seeking to bolster their electoral support during this time period have been employing femonationalist appeals to attract this set of voters (Fernandes et al., 2025). The expansion hypothesis reads:

H5: (Expansion Hypothesis) Prior gender egalitarian attitudes increase the likelihood of RRP supporters holding gender egalitarian nativist attitudes.

While the repeat cross-section design of the EVS prevents us from determining this, we can shed light on the origins of these gender egalitarian nativist voters by turning to panel data. Here we employ the LISS panel data from the Netherlands. We examine 15 annual surveys asked of a common panel of respondents in the Netherlands from December 2007 to March 2023. The panel structure of LISS data allows us to track within-individual changes in attitudes and party support across multiple time periods, providing suitable data to causally test the conversion versus expansion arguments. Examining the Dutch case in particular provides several additional advantages. The

popularity of the Dutch PRR parties - the PVV and FvD - means that the survey data has a sufficient number of RRP voters to be able to fully explore voter attitudinal dynamics. That being said, the fact that the Netherlands is known for having higher than average levels of societal nativism and gender egalitarianism (Howard, 2013; Mudde, 2015: 299; EIGE, 2022) means that this country poses a tougher test for finding our expected RRP supporter attitudinal differences relative to the broader electorate.

To test for the possibility of conversion versus expansion, we construct LISS measures of RRP support, gender traditional attitudes and nativist attitudes similar to those we used in the EVS cross-sectional analysis. As we show in the Supplemental Material (see SM Table A13-A14), we find support for the same conclusions about the primacy of nativism, gender traditional attitudes, and the interaction between them as we discussed in the previous EVS section in Tables 1 and 2.¹⁸ Given the similarities, we feel confident in the generalizability of our earlier cross-national conclusions to the Dutch case and in using the LISS data to explore the origins of gender egalitarian nativist voters.

In Table 3, we test for the possibility of conversion, by examining whether a given individual reports a shift in gender attitudes following their identification as an RRP supporter. When we regress change in gender attitudes (t minus $t-1$) on lagged RRP vote ($t-1$) controlling for nativist stance, we find no statistically significant effect.¹⁹ We continue to find no significant effect if we rerun the models only on those respondents who are nativists at time t ; only on those respondents who remain RRP voters; or on only those respondents who are both nativist and RRP voters at time t , to even more directly assess the origins of gender egalitarian nativist RRP supporters (See SM Tables A17–A19). Thus, while RRP supporters might have an attitudinal impact on their supporters, there is no evidence that they are affecting supporter attitudes on gender roles.

If respondents are not becoming gender egalitarian nativists after pledging their support to the RRP, do they represent an expansion of the RRP's traditional electorate? Looking back at our original interactive models of RRP support in the EVS data in Table 2 (replicated in the LISS data in SM Table A14), we find results consistent with the expansion story: those respondents who report being gender egalitarian nativists also, in the same survey wave, report supporting the RRP. Indeed, other scholars (e.g., Lancaster, 2019; Spierings et al., 2017) have assumed such contemporaneous correlations constitute expansion.

However, to more explicitly test the electorate expansion mechanism behind the emergence of gender egalitarian nativist RRP supporters, we construct alternative panel-based models of respondent attitudes and behavior *over time*. In Table 4, we model how respondent attitudes on gender and nativism in the previous wave ($t-1$) affect likelihood of expressing a gender egalitarian and nativist

Table 3. LISS: No evidence of RRP supporter conversion to gender egalitarians.

	Dependent variable		
	Gender Tra. $t - (t-1)$		
	W1-W2	W3:W15	Pooled
RRP support ($t-1$)	0.029 (0.031)	0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)
AntiOther (t)	0.018 (0.021)	0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,166	32,916	36,082
R ²	0.003	0.003	0.003

Note. ⁺ $p < 0.1$; ^{*} $p < 0.05$; ^{**} $p < 0.01$; ^{***} $p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table 4. LISS: Support for expansion of the RRP electorate hypothesis.

	Dependent variable		
	Gender egalitarian-nativists (t)		
	W1-W2	W3:W15	Pooled
AntiOther ($t-1$)	14.134 ^{***} (0.666)	0.599 ⁺ (0.311)	0.614 [*] (0.308)
Gender egalitarian ($t-1$)	2.520 ^{***} (0.411)	2.546 ^{***} (0.122)	2.544 ^{***} (0.120)
RRP support ($t-1$)	-0.370 (0.400)	-0.029 (0.120)	-0.051 (0.116)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	225	3,495	3,720

Note. ⁺ $p < 0.1$; ^{*} $p < 0.05$; ^{**} $p < 0.01$; ^{***} $p < 0.001$. Logit models with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Analysis conducted on respondents reporting support for the RRP at time t .

attitude, among RRP supporters at time t . We also control for previous RRP support ($t-1$) as well as demographic controls, including respondent gender. To more easily line up with our quantity of interest, here we flip the gender attitudes measure to code gender egalitarian as “1” and gender traditional as “0.”

The results offer support for an expansion story. First, holding gender egalitarian nativist views among RRP supporters in time period t is positively correlated with being gender egalitarian and with being nativist in the previous period ($t-1$). The gender attitudes result is strongly statistically significant across the three models, while the nativist variable is significant in all three, but only at $p < .054$ in the W3-15 model. Also notably, previous support for the radical right party is not a statistically significant




Figure 2. Gender traditional (GT) versus gender egalitarian (GE) attitudes by respondent gender among nativist RRP supporters.

predictor of being a gender egalitarian nativist RRP supporter in the next time period. In other words, these are new supporters, attracted to the RRP while already holding gender egalitarian and nativist views.

Second, further supportive evidence of electorate expansion can be seen in the impact of respondent gender on the likelihood of being part of this non-traditional RRP electorate. While radical right party supporters are more likely to be men (Coffé, 2018; Givens, 2004; Hartevelde et al., 2015; Spierings and Zaslove, 2015; Weeks et al., 2023), we find that RRP women voters are more likely to be gender egalitarian nativists than men – see Figure 2. This finding also emerges in our statistical analyses: whereas all our previous EVS and LISS models reveal that being a man is a positive predictor of RRP support in general (SM Tables A11 and A23), being a woman has a positive significant effect when predicting *gender egalitarian nativist* RRP supporters.²⁰ In other words, these gender egalitarian nativists are not the same (mostly male) voters that the RRP has attracted before; the RRP is drawing upon a new set of (largely) women supporters.

Conclusions

The goal of this article is to better understand the dynamics of gender role and nativist attitudes among the RRP electorate in Western Europe over time, using the most extensive survey data on these issues. We find consistent support for both processes of continuity and change across multiple survey instruments involving different countries, years, and research designs with different question wordings. While we confirm that nativism has consistently distinguished these parties and their voters from other political actors, we also bring new evidence to support the idea that RRP supporters stand out for their gender

traditional attitudes. This distinction is present as of 1999 in the EVS cross-national data. Strikingly, we also find the presence of interactive effects between these variables, with the RRP electorate also characterized by a set of gender egalitarian nativist supporters that emerges starting in 2009. Indeed, as shown by the overlapping confidence intervals in Figure 1, these egalitarian nativists are equally likely to support radical right parties as their gender traditional nativist counterparts. This shift in the distinctiveness and composition of RRP (and the timing thereof) has not been previously recognized with such diverse data and with a focus on attitudes about women’s role in society, the workplace and the family.

Exploiting the panel structure of the Dutch data also allows us to confirm causally for the first time that these gender egalitarian voters are not the product of voter conversion, whereby supporters change their gender attitudes after establishing allegiance to RRP. Rather, RRP are expanding their electorate by attracting new, especially women, voters who already hold gender egalitarian and nativist views.

In shedding light on the long-run dynamics of RRP gender role and nativist attitudes, this study has begun to identify additional factors that can shape these trends. Just as voter gender is playing a role in the recent wave of gender egalitarian nativists, future research could usefully examine whether there may be other voter characteristics that impact these attitudes. For instance, Lancaster (2022) highlights a generational dimension to gender egalitarian and nativist attitudes across voters in general, whereby younger voters are more likely to be both gender egalitarian and nativist. But young people are also involved in a growing conservative backlash against the promises of feminism and gender egalitarian attitudes; see the emergence of the “Tradwives” trend and right-wing influencers (Miller-Idriss, 2025). More research is thus needed into the implications of

these conservative, often female-inclusive movements for both RRP vote levels in general and the male-dominated gender gap in particular. Related, more attention needs to be given to the implications of intersectionality for the dynamics of RRP support. Studies have shown that Western European RRP voters are not just men or, now increasingly, women, but white men and women (Guildea, 2025; Norocel et al., 2020). This racialized dimension of radical right party support is further exacerbated by femonationalist appeals claiming that immigrant men are threats to white women (Farris, 2017; Miller-Idriss, 2025). The observed trends in gender role and nativist attitudes we report in this paper therefore do not necessarily apply equally across ethnic and racial lines. With growing support around the world for RRP and radical right policies among people of color, we might anticipate the emergence of new and different constellations of attitudes about gender roles and nativism. These are important questions to examine.

Just as our article points to additional voter characteristics to examine, it also suggests new directions in the study of party strategies and radical right party fortunes. While issue diversification – or switching away from their original issues – has been touted as a niche party tactic for attracting new voters (Bergman and Flatt, 2020; Hobolt and De Vries, 2015; Meguid, 2023; Rovny and Polk, 2020; Spoon and Williams, 2021), this study exposes a possible underappreciated strategy: radical right parties can rely on their core issue (perhaps reframed in gendered terms) to attract new voters. Direct causal evidence is still, however, needed to assess the impact of femonationalism on attracting gender egalitarian (and other) nativists to the RRP.

Yet there may be long-term costs to this strategy for the RRP. The incorporation of gender egalitarian nativists introduces a new female-driven gender disparity to a party family previously known for its male dominance. While this result does not mean that there are no gender egalitarian nativist men being attracted to radical right parties (see Figure 2), this reverse gender divide sets up a potential future struggle within the party over gender policy priorities and party image. Indeed, this possibility has been foreshadowed by scholars (e.g., Adams et al., 2022; Homola, 2022; Petterson, 2017) in response to RRP efforts to increase women's descriptive representation and emphasize women's interests. That being said, it is not clear that such a conflict is inevitable. Our expansion models continue to suggest that these voters, like their gender traditional counterparts, are also being drawn into the RRP on the basis of nativist attitudes. Thus, internal party debates perhaps can be minimized if the RRP can maintain focus on their original core issue of nativism. Such questions are the subject for future research.

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Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. This question is available for the LISS data and waves 3 and 4 of the EVS. For wave 5 of the EVS, we follow scholars in examining the variable recording which party most appeals to the respondent (e.g., Christley, 2022; Spierings and Glas, 2021).
2. But see Spierings (2021) on the emergence of homonationalist stances among RRP in some Western European countries.
3. In the piece introducing the concept of “sexual modern nativists” and looking at data from 2002 to 2012, Spierings et al. (2017) does not examine gender role attitudes.
4. While our models explicitly measure the impact of attitudes about gender roles, as a robustness check, we also rerun the models controlling for the respondent's attitudes on the LGBTQ + community, following the focus of Spierings (2021), Spierings et al. (2017), Spierings and Glas (2021), Lancaster (2019) and Allen and Wallace Goodman (2021). While confirming the distinction between these two sets of attitudes, we continue to find support for our gender role-based findings (see SM Tables A9-A10).
5. Countries in the EVS analysis include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These are the Western European countries for which respondents could choose to support an RRP in EVS waves.
6. Waves one and two (from 1981 to 1990, respectively) were excluded because they contained an insufficient number of RRP supporters.
7. The emergence of similar findings with LISS data, which consistently uses the voter intention question of EVS waves

- 3 and 4, increases our confidence in the comparability of the EVS measures over time.
8. The list of RRP included in the analyses is found in the Supplemental Material (SM).
 9. See SM Variable Details section and [SM Tables A7 and A8](#).
 10. Reassuringly, this underestimation would, if anything, bias the results against finding support for our hypotheses.
 11. See SM LISS Variable Details Section and [SM Tables A13 and A14](#). Our results are also robust to the use of alternative measures of anti-immigration policy preferences available for waves four and five of the EVS and all waves of the LISS data (see [SM Variable Details section and SM Tables A6 and A20](#)).
 12. The summary statistics are found in [SM Table A1](#).
 13. The results from the cross-national EVS data are robust to a jackknife analysis of the pooled model in [Table 2](#) by excluding each country one at a time. See [SM Figure B1](#).
 14. Due to the limitations of the R “effects” package, [Figure 1](#) results shown are for the pooled model without robust clustered standard errors. As shown in [Table A5](#) in the SM, the results of that model are consistent with those of the pooled Model 4 in [Table 2](#).
 15. This finding runs counter to the non-nuanced Hypothesis 2 and the result seen in the additive model in [Table 1](#).
 16. This effect is statistically significant in waves 4, 5 and the pooled model.
 17. [Spierings et al. \(2017\)](#) and [Lancaster \(2019\)](#) discuss the existence of “sexually-modern” nativists, but do not examine their origins.
 18. Consistent with the pre-2009 EVS wave 3, analyses of the LISS survey waves before 2009 (Waves 1 and 2) show that nativism does not modify the effect of gender attitudes on RRP support.
 19. The results do not change if we rerun [Table 3](#) with ordered logit models ([SM Table A16](#)). For completeness, we also calculate the effect of prior RRP support on a shift to nativist attitudes. While this is unlikely to account for the phenomenon of gender egalitarian nativists, the effect is also not significant ([SM Table A15](#)).
 20. Recall that [Lancaster \(2019\)](#) and [Allen and Wallace Goodman \(2021\)](#) find a female gender effect, but with “sexually modern” or pro-LGBTQ+ nativists.

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